"The view that China has become increasingly assertive under President Xi Jinping is now a common trope in academic and media discourse. However, until the end of Xi Jinping's first term in March 2018, China had been relatively restrained in its use of coercive economic measures. This is puzzling given the conventional belief among scholars and practitioners that sanctions are a middle ground between diplomatic and military/paramilitary action. Using a wide range of methods and data -- including in-depth interviews with 76 current and former politicians, policy-makers, diplomats, and commercial actors across 12 countries and 16 cities -- Sanctions with Chinese Characteristics: Rhetoric and Restraint in China's Diplomacy examines the ways in which China had employed economic sanctions to further its political objectives, and the factors explaining China's behaviour. This book provides a systematic investigation into the ways in which Chinese decisionmakers approached sanctions both at the United Nations Security Council and unilaterally, and shows how China's longstanding sanctions rhetoric has had a constraining effect on its behaviour, resulting in its inability to employ sanctions in complete alignment with its immediate interests."--.

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgments
• 1. The Puzzle of Chinese Sanctions
  • 1.1 Arguments and implications
  • 1.2 Chapter overview
• 2. On Sanctions and China
  • 2.1 Thinking about sanctions
    • 2.1.1 Coercive sanctions
    • 2.1.2 Constraining sanctions
    • 2.1.3 Signalling sanctions
  • 2.2 China and sanctions: existing explanations
    • 2.2.1 Explanation 1: China was not yet powerful enough
    • 2.2.2 Explanation 2: The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors
    • 2.2.3 Explanation 3: China’s participation in the WTO shaped its sanctions behaviour
    • 2.2.4 Explanation 4: History and culture shaped China’s sanctions behaviour
  • 2.3 Conclusion
• 3. When Does Talk Become Costly?
  • International Audience Costs and China’s Sanctions Behaviour
  • 3.1 International audience costs
    • 3.1.1 On audience costs
    • 3.1.2 What are ‘international audience costs’ and why do they matter?
    • 3.1.3 Condition 1: The offender needs to be concerned about international opinion
    • 3.1.4 Condition 2: There must be at least one rhetorical actor present
  • 3.2 The effects of international audience costs on China’s sanctions behaviour
    • 3.2.1 China’s quest for recognition and higher international status
    • 3.2.2 Sanctions rhetoric as China’s counter-stigmatisation strategy
  • 3.3 Conclusion
• 4. Stigmatising Sanctions and China’s Counter-Stigmatisation
  • 4.1 Stigmatising sanctions and stigma management strategies
    • 4.1.1 Defining stigma and stigmatising sanctions
    • 4.1.2 Stigma management strategies and their implications
    • 4.1.3 China and stigmatising sanctions
  • 4.2 US and Europe’s stigmatising sanctions against China, 1949 onwards
    • 4.2.1 The inception of sanctions against China, 1949-1971
    • 4.2.2 Motivations behind US sanctions against China
    • 4.2.3 China’s response to Cold War sanctions
    • 4.2.4 China’s admission to the UN
    • 4.2.5 The road to China’s UN admission
    • 4.2.6 China’s reaction to its UN admission
    • 4.2.7 The lifting of Cold War sanctions and beginning of US-led sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident
    • 4.2.8 The extent of post-Tiananmen sanctions, 1989-1993
    • 4.2.9 China’s response to the Tiananmen sanctions
    • 4.2.10 Post-Tiananmen debates, 1993 onwards
  • 4.3 China’s counter-stigmatisation: its sanctions frame at the UNSC, 1997-2016
    • 4.3.1 Method of analysis
    • 4.3.2 China’s stated standards of sanctions legitimacy at the UNSC, 1997-2016
  • 4.4 Conclusion
• 5. China and United Nations Security Council Sanctions
  • 5.1 China and UNSC sanctions: correlation analysis and case study selection
    • 5.1.1 Correlation analysis: methodology
    • 5.1.2 Correlation analysis: the relevance of the rhetoric-based hypothesis
    • 5.1.3 Selection of case studies
    • 5.1.4 China and sanctions: five competing hypotheses
  • 5.2 China and sanctions against the DPRK: from resistance to cooperation
    • 5.2.1 Background of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK
    • 5.2.2 Competing explanations concerning China’s behaviour towards DPRK sanctions
    • 5.2.3 Playing up China’s non-proliferation commitments: the US as a rhetorical actor
    • 5.2.4 Conclusion of the DPRK case
  • 5.3 China’s rejection of proposed sanctions against Syria
    • 5.3.1 Background of proposed UNSC sanctions against Syria
    • 5.3.2 Competing explanations for China’s behaviour towards sanctions against Syria
    • 5.3.3 Explaining China’s behaviour: discourse on human rights, intervention, and the Libya effect
    • 5.3.4 Conclusion of the Syrian case
  • 5.4 China’s support for sanctions against Guinea-Bissau: a failed test?
    • 5.4.1 Background of the Guinea-Bissau case
    • 5.4.2 Competing explanations for China’s behaviour towards sanctions against Guinea-Bissau
    • 5.4.3 Explaining China’s voting behaviour towards Guinea-Bissau sanctions: the lack of a rhetorical actor
    • 5.4.4 Conclusion of the Guinea-Bissau case
  • 5.5 Conclusion
• 6. China’s Unilateral Sanctions: Eight Classic Cases Revisited
  • 6.1 China’s use (or non-use) of unilateral sanctions in the eight classic cases
    • 6.1.1 China-France dispute over French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama
    • 6.1.2 China-US dispute over arms sales to Taiwan
    • 6.1.3 China-Japan dispute over a trawler collision in mutually claimed waters
    • 6.1.4 China-Norway dispute over the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu Xiaobo
    • 6.1.5 China-Philippines dispute over the Scarborough Shoal
    • 6.1.6 China-Vietnam dispute over an oil rig
    • 6.1.7 China-Taiwan dispute over the newly elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to explicitly endorse the ‘1992 Consensus’
    • 6.1.8 China-South Korea dispute over the deployment of the US THAAD system
  • 6.2 Evidence from the eight classic cases: summary and interpretation
• 7. Demystifying China’s Sanctions Behaviour
  • 7.1 China’s unilateral sanctions behaviour: possible explanations
    • 7.1.1 China was not yet powerful enough to employ unilateral sanctions effectively
    • 7.1.2 The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors
    • 7.1.3 China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) shaped its sanctions behaviour
    • 7.1.4 History and culture shaped China’s sanctions behaviour, leading Chinese leaders to prefer inducement over coercion
    • 7.1.5 China’s sanctions rhetoric constrained its behaviour
    • 7.1.6 Limitations of the rhetoric-based hypothesis
  • 7.2 Lessons from the ‘eight classic cases’
• 8. China’s Sanctions Dilemma
  • 8.1 Policy and theoretical implications
  • 8.2 The future of China’s sanctions rhetoric and behaviour
  • 8.3 Areas for further study
• Appendix A
  • United Nations Security Council Meeting Records: Coverage of Speeches by Chinese Representatives, 1997-2016
• Appendix B
  • Complete List of Proposed United Nations Security Council Sanctions-Related Resolutions, 1971-2016
• Appendix C
  • China’s Material Interests with Targeted Sanctions Regimes
• Bibliography
• Index
• List of Figures and Tables
  • Figures
    • Figure 3.1 Effects of Rhetorical Action on Behaviour and the Triggering of International Audience Costs
    • Figure 3.2 Effects of International Audience Costs and Rhetorical Action on China’s Sanctions Behaviour
    • Figure 6.1 Vietnam’s Trade with China, 2000-2014
    • Figure 7.1 Vietnam’s Trade with China and its Other Major Partners, January – June 2014
  • Tables
    • Table 2.1 Sanctions Spectrum and the Expected Material Impact of Sanctions on Target States
    • Table 3.1 Rhetorical Tools and Their Impact on International Attention
    • Table 3.2 The Five Competing Hypotheses
    • Table 4.1 Stigma Management Strategies and Their Implications
    • Table 4.2 China’s Arguments on Sanctions-Related Resolutions at the UNSC, 1997-2016
    • Table 4.3 China’s Stated Standards of Sanctions Legitimacy at the UNSC
    • Table 5.1 Results of Correlation Analysis Regarding China’s Interests, Rhetoric, and Sanctions Voting
    • Table 5.2 The 34 Consolidated Sanctions Resolution Cases Categorised According to Their Apparent Alignment with the Rhetoric-based Hypothesis
    • Table 5.3 Comparison of Assessed Level of Effectiveness for Each Competing Hypothesis (H1-5)
    • Table 6.1 Trend of EU-China Trade, 2007-2016
    • Table 6.2 Mindanao’s Export of Banana-Related Products to China, 2011-2015
    • Table 6.3 Chinese Visitors to the Philippines, January-December 2012
    • Table 6.4 South Korea’s Top Trading Partners, 2017
    • Table 6.5 Extent of Sanctions Imposed by China in the Eight Classic Cases, 2008-2018
    • Table 7.1 Summary and Extent of Alignment across Categories of China’s Use of Economic, Political, and Military Pressure in the Eight Classic Cases