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Table of Contents
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Organizing Principles and Chapter Content
- Part I: Conflict in Imperfect Cities
- Prelude
- 1. Stasis as Civil War
- I. What Is Stasis?
- I.1. A Universal Profile of Factionalizers
- I.2. Causal Triggers versus Spectacles
- II. What Stasis Is Not
- III. Stasis and Plato’s Theory of Political History
- IV. The Athenian Constitution, Thucydides, and Polybius
- V. The Ideal of Stasis-Free Politics
- I. What Is Stasis?
- 2. The Unique Problem of Partisanship
- I. The Priority and Problem of Political Identity
- I.1. Three Familiar Traits
- I.2. A Few Problems Solved
- II. Explaining Intractable Conflict
- II.1. The Inadequacy of Greed
- II.2. Two Emotions, a Distinctive Fallacy, and the Derivation of Despotism
- II.3. The Overarching Goal of Partisan Life
- III. Partisanship as Discriminatory Elitism
- III.1. A New Brand of Elitism
- III.2. The Incompatibility of Partisanship and the Best Sort of City
- I. The Priority and Problem of Political Identity
- 3. Managing Mistrust in Average Cities
- I. The Challenges of Rule by One
- I.1. The Congenital Defects of Rule by One
- I.2. Mitigating the Problems of Rule by One
- II. The Problems of Partisan Rule
- II.1. The Congenital Defects of Rule by Partisans
- II.2. Mitigating the Problems of Rule by Partisans
- III. The Problems of Mixed Rule
- III.1. The Intractable Problem of Mixed Government
- III.2. Mitigating the Problem of Mixed Government with Those in the Middle
- IV. Why Polity Is Usually Best
- I. The Challenges of Rule by One
- Part II: Conflict among Perfect Citizens
- Prelude
- 4. Dispute and Disagreement
- I. Epistemic Limitations of the Phronimoi
- I.1. The Epistemic Limitations of Political Decision Making
- I.2. Initial and Persistent Disagreement over Political Decisions
- II. The Problem of Multiple Best Actions for the Polis
- II.1. Virtue and Zero-Sum Environments
- II.2. Unsatisfactory Counterarguments
- III. Too Much Pessimism for the Best of All Cities?
- I. Epistemic Limitations of the Phronimoi
- 5. Contending for Civic Flourishing
- I. Virtuous Citizens Wish for Honor
- II. Political Competitions
- II.1. Ruling and Being Ruled
- II.2. Competitive Elections for Office
- II.3. A Competitive Reconstruction of Political Rhetoric
- II.4. Jockeying for Political Influence among Deliberators
- III. Contending as a Fine Activity
- Part III: Aristotelian Conflict and Modern Political Thought
- Prelude
- 6. Conflict and Constitutionalism
- I. The Posteriority of the Rule of Law
- II. External Checks: Aristotle on Limited Government
- III. Internal Checks
- III.1. Aristotle’s Conception of Functional Separation among Rulers
- III.2. Functional Separation as a Tactic for Thwarting Arbitrary Rule
- III.3. Aristotle on the Possibility of Constitutional Balance
- 7. Conflict and Democratic Theory
- I. Democracy as Self-Government of the People
- II. Deliberative Democracy
- III. Democracy without Self-Government
- IV. Democracy without Self-Government: Agonism
- V. Democracy without Self-Government: Interest Pluralism
- VI. Democracy without Self-Government: Plebiscitarianism
- VI.1. Weber and the Sociology of Democratic Struggle
- VI.2. Weber and Aristotle
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index Locorum
- General Index
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