The law sometimes permits what ordinary morality, or widely-shared notions of right and wrong, reproaches. Rights to Do Grave Wrong explores the relationship between law and common morality to clarify law's reliance on society's broad presumption that people will exercise their rights responsibly. More concretely, he argues that certain legal rights rest on tacit sociological assumptions as to who will exercise them, under what circumstances, and how frequently. Further, he argues that we depend on stigma and shame to reduce and circumscribe the law's use. Some examples: though reneging on a debt is considered wrong, the law allows you to declare personal bankruptcy; international law allows museums to retain some masterworks looted from their rightful owners; in many countries abortion is permitted as a means of birth control. Using these examples and more, Osiel presents a "social scientific" analysis of law's interaction with social mores and the extent to which they limit our exercising rights to do wrong. The paradox he intends to elucidate is when and why it is appropriate for societies to champion de jure entitlements even as they successfully limit their de facto usage.--.

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Epigraphs
• Introduction: Defining the Puzzle
• 1. Common Morality, Social Mores, and the Law
• 2. A Sampling of Rights to Do Wrong
• 3. Three Rights to Do Wrong
• 4. How to “Abuse” a Right
• 5. Law and Morality in Ordinary Language and Social Science
• 6. Divergences of Law and Morals: Sites and Sources
• 7. Convergences of Law and Morals: Sites and Sources
• 8. Questions of Method and Meaning: The Law at Odds with Common Morality
• 9. Why This Book Is Not What You Had in Mind
• 10. The Changing Stance of Lawyers toward Common Morality
• 11. Commercial Morality, Bourgeois Virtue, and the Law
• 12. How We Attach Responsibilities to Rights
• 13. Common Morality Confronts Modernity
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Acknowledgments
• Index