"On the basis of careful textual exegesis and philosophical analysis, and contrary to the received view, Mark R. Wheeler demonstrates that Aristotle presents and systematically explicates his definition of the essence of the truth in the Metaphysics. Aristotle states the nominal definitions of the terms "truth" and "falsehood" as part of his arguments in defense of the logical axioms. These nominal definitions express conceptions of truth and falsehood his philosophical opponents would have recognized and accepted in the context of dialectical argument. On the basis of these nominal definitions, Aristotle develops his definitions of the essences of truth and falsehood--his "real" definitions of truth and falsehood. Aristotle's methodical exposition of his essential definitions of truth and falsehood in the Metaphysics serves as a well-developed example of how his philosophical inquiry starts with nominal definitions and ends with real definitions. Wheeler also argues for the novel claim that Aristotle defines the most fundamental kind of truth in terms of accurate measurement. Aristotle's metrical conception of truth serves as the theoretical basis for specifying the truth conditions of various assertions, for identifying the sorts of beings implicated in these truth conditions, and for explaining the nature of approximate truth and falsehood. Far from offering us a minimal account of truth, Wheeler shows how Aristotle offers us a sophisticated and metrical theory of truth"--.

• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Stating the Puzzles
  • The Knots
  • My Approach to the Metaphysics
• Part I: Philosophical Wisdom and Truth
  • Chapter 1 The Demands of Philosophical Wisdom
    • The Divine Science
    • Hitting the Barn Door
    • Being, Truth, and Causality
    • The Beta Test
    • Conclusion
• Part II: Truth and the Logical Axioms
  • Chapter 2 What “Truth” and “Falsehood” Signify
    • The Canonical Definition of Truth in Context
    • Kinds of Definition
    • Arguing for the Axioms
    • Aristotle’s Fundamental Philosophical Semantics
    • Aristotle’s Opponents
    • The Nominal Definition of “Truth”
    • What the Nominal Definitions Entail
    • Conclusion
  • Chapter 3 The Nominal Definition of “Truth” and the Axioms
    • Truth and the Law of the Excluded Middle
    • Simple Assertions and Contradictory Pairs
    • Intermediate Assertions and LNC
    • The Elenctic Argument at 1011b23-29 and the Nominal Definitions
    • Conclusion
• Part III: Truth and Being
  • Chapter 4 The Being of Truth
    • Truth is a Kind of Being
    • Being True is not Being a Kind of Object
    • Matthen’s Proposal
    • Being a True Assertion
    • Truth and the Other Kinds of Being
    • Conclusion
  • Chapter 5 Aristotle’s Homonymous Truth Bearers
    • The Homonymous Kinds of Truth and Falsehood
    • True and False Assertions
    • True and False Things
    • Aristotle’s Core Kind of Truth and Falsehood
    • Conclusion
  • Chapter 6 The Genus of Truth
    • Identifying the Genus
    • The Category of the Genus of Truth
    • An Outstanding Problem: True Definitions of Essences
    • Conclusion
  • Chapter 7 The Activity of Truth
    • True Assertions about Simples
    • The Core Kind of Truth Redux
    • The Power and Activity of Truth
    • Conclusion
• Part IV: Truth and Measurement
  • Chapter 8 Truth, Oneness, and Measurement
    • The Extension of the Term “One”
    • The Intension of the Term “One”
    • Metaphysics Δ 6 on Oneness and Measure
    • Conclusion
  • Chapter 9 The Ground of Truth
    • The Measure and the Measured
    • Aristotle’s Measure Doctrine
    • Aristotle’s Metrical Account of the Correspondence Relation
    • Aristotle’s Asymetrical Measurement Relation
    • Conclusion
• Conclusion: The Subsequent Free Play of Thought
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Index Locorum